Introduction
In the last couple of decades or so there has been a pronounced ontological turn in contemporary political theory, of all stripes, towards thinking about the quintessential dynamics of the 'political' in the kind of transcendental mode famously exemplified by Schmitt. Radical democrats have been particularly drawn to this style of reflection because it is seen as a powerful way of overturning some of the basic presumptions of a prevailing liberal orthodoxy and putting forward a more radical vision of democracy. For these radical democrats, the 'essence' of the political resides in the revelation of the groundlessness of social existence, that is, that there is no natural order of things and that any social-democratic regime is an arbitrary configuration of power that cannot lay claim to an incontestable legitimacy. The uncovering of this radical contingency does not lead to a cynical realism, rather it is intended to heighten an awareness of the latent exclusions and submerged conflicts that are an inescapable feature of any democratic order -even the apparently most inclusive -and thereby to strengthen a commitment to a radical counter-hegemonic politics. The claim is, then, that this ontological mode of reflection on the political is not a straightforward form of idealizing abstraction but rather has an intrinsic connection to the critique of power from the perspective of the powerless and excluded.
Given the avowed commitment to counter-hegemonic struggle and progressive social change, the issue of agency is central to these theories of radical democracy. How are marginal and systematically disempowered groups able to challenge the dominant order, what forms should radical democratic agency take and so forth? Although these issues cannot be definitively answered, the critique of power involves nonetheless a certain degree of reflection on the social conditions necessary for effective agency, especially given the persistence of systematic social inequalities and forms of disempowerment, such as gender. Looking at the work of Chantal Mouffe, I argue here that, far from even beginning to address the question of power and agency, her style of ontological reflection on the political entirely disregards it, relying instead on formulaic and empty abstractions. The nominalism that underpins her paradigm means that the distinction she maintains between the ontological and the ontic, the political and the social, turns out to be an expedient dualism that enables her to close off crucial issues of agency and power in favour of an invariant linguistic logic. As a result, Mouffe finishes by offering a socially weightless theory of radical democracy that is so far removed from the actual practices and dynamics of everyday life that, ultimately, its own validity or relevance is thrown into question. Not dissimilar to other radical democratic formulations of the political, she deploys abstract categories of indeterminacy and undecidability as ciphers for radical political action. These messianic notions of agency as non-identity are questionable, both because it is unclear how they relate to the practical logic of action and also because their radical nature is held to be self-evident rather than more carefully justified.
Radical democracy and the ontological turn 1
Over the last couple of decades or so, normative theory, of all stripes, has taken on a distinctly transcendental focus, in that it has become increasingly preoccupied with abstract notions of the 'political'. Unlike, say, political theory of the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s which was oriented to sociological issues such as the decline of class, the rise of pluralism, and the legitimacy of state, current thinking is dominated by attempts to capture the foundational or quintessential dynamics of the political, and, on that basis, to arrive at some formal model or another of democracy.
2 The concept of the political has, in a certain sense, come to the rescue of political philosophy; it has saved it 'after it had fallen victim to too much science, too much compromise, too much realism'.
3 There are, of course, as many different understandings of how this abstract mode of reflection should proceed as there are ideological divisions, but, to run the risk of simplification, a distinctive feature of recent thought on radical democracy has been its elaboration of ideas of the political in explicitly ontological terms. 4 These notions of the 'political' are not ontological in a strict philosophical sense, but they are in the sense that they start from claims about fundamental existential features of social being and then, from these claims, derive models of democracy which arguably best enshrine, contain, or draw out these features. They are, in Stephen K White's terms, 'weak ontologies' that, rather than deliver cast iron certainties, tend to highlight, in varying ways, the fundamental contestability and contingency of social existence and the
